Abstract-The active safety systems available in passenger cars today automatically deploy automated safety interventions in situations where the driver is in need of assistance. In this paper, we consider the process of determining whether such interventions are needed. In particular, we design a threat assessment method that evaluates the risk that the vehicle will either leave the road or its maneuverability will be significantly reduced within a finite time horizon. The proposed threat assessment method accounts for combined braking and steering maneuvers, which results in a nonlinear dynamical vehicle behavior. We formulate the threat assessment problem as a nonconvex constraint satisfaction problem (CSP) and implement an algorithm that solves it through interval-based consistency techniques. Experimental validation of the proposed approach indicates that constraint violation can be predicted while avoiding the detection of false threats.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HIS paper considers the threat assessment problem in automotive driver assistance systems. In particular, we consider automotive safety systems with the capability of activating automated safety interventions in case there is a risk that the vehicle will depart the road. According to [1] , roadway departure accidents account for approximately half of trafficrelated fatalities [1] . Several systems that attempt reducing such accident either through warnings or interventions have therefore been proposed [2] , [3] . A common problem in safety systems is the problem of determining whether a situation is critical such that an automated intervention needs to be activated. We refer to this problem as the threat assessment problem.
A challenging aspect of the threat assessment problem is that it is inherently associated with potentially conflicting objectives. On one hand, safety systems need to detect critical situations and adequately assist the driver whenever this is necessary to ensure vehicle safety. On the other hand, alerts or interventions that drivers consider unnecessary contribute negatively to their confidence in such systems. A highlighting example of this is the case where a safety system suddenly performs an unmotivated full-braking intervention. If such an unmotivated intervention occurs, the driver's confidence in the safety system would be seriously compromised. In commercially available safety systems, interventions are therefore often suppressed in uncertain situations and issued only once accidents have become unavoidable for the driver.
In [4] , we presented a model-based threat assessment method, specifically accounting for limitations in the vehicle's and the driver's ability in safely driving the vehicle. We proposed a solution to the problem of evaluating whether an admissible steering maneuver exists, which can drive the vehicle, while keeping it within a prescribed subset of the state and input space, where the driver is deemed capable of preserving vehicle safety. The underlying idea is that, if such a steering maneuver does not exist, the driver can be deemed incapable of maintaining safety without assistance, and an autonomous assisting intervention is thus motivated.
In this paper, we extend the problem formulation and instead propose a solution to the problem of evaluating whether an admissible combined steering and braking maneuver exists, which can drive the vehicle while maintaining it within a prescribed subset of the state and input space. Similar to [4] , the underlying idea is that, if such a maneuver does not exist, the driver can be deemed incapable of maintaining safety without assistance. By excluding the possible existence of combined maneuvers, the risk for unwanted interventions is even further reduced, and autonomous assisting interventions are thus even more motivated.
Although the reachability analysis tools used to develop the method that we proposed in [4] are powerful, they are restricted to linear (and piecewise affine) systems with polyhedral constraints. Dynamical models that simultaneously capture a vehicle's longitudinal and lateral dynamics are however, in general, nonlinear. In the design of threat assessment algorithms that account for combined braking and steering, the restriction to reachability analysis tools for linear systems can thus be limiting. For systems with nonlinear dynamics and possibly nonlinear nonconvex constraints, reachable sets are more difficult to compute. In [5] , the reachable set for a nonlinear system is approximated by considering a large number of candidate trajectories generated using rapidly exploring random trees. This method can generate a large number of candidate trajectories, but the resulting reachable set is always a subset of the true reachable set. A different approach is considered in [6] , where an algorithm for computing the backward reachable set for a nonlinear system is presented. The approach proposed in [6] however requires the solution of a time-dependent partial differential equation that, similar to many other approaches, is associated with high memory and computational costs. A discussion on algorithms for computing reachable sets for complex systems is provided in [7] .
In the approach presented here, we reformulate our threat assessment problem as a CSP with nonlinear equality constraints. This is a nonconvex problem formulation. In solving this problem, we resort to interval-based consistency techniques, which have been applied in several different domains. Examples are model-based fault detection, model-based fault diagnosis, robust control, and robotics, (see e.g., [8] ).
When using interval techniques, the solution sets (see Definition 1) are represented by one or several intervals or boxes. By restricting the sets to this limited structure, the interval-based methods can be used to obtain approximate solutions to nonconvex constraint satisfaction problems, enabling the possibility to utilize nonlinear models and constraints. As will be shown in Section IV, these solutions can be arbitrarily close to the true solutions if sufficient computational resources are available. Nevertheless, in reality, computational resources are always limited, and the interval-based approaches offer a flexible tradeoff between computation time and accuracy. Iteratively, they improve the accuracy of the approximate solution, and this can continue until the computational time is finished. Then a solution, which is guaranteed to enclose the true solution, is returned. This means that a result is returned even when the available computational time is insufficient to achieve the desired accuracy. For algorithms that run in real time, this is an important benefit.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the models used in the threat assessment algorithm to describe the vehicle behavior. In Section III, the threat assessment problem is formulated as a constraint satisfaction problem. Section IV introduces the fundamental concepts of interval analysis. The proposed algorithm for the threat assessment problem is presented in Section V. In Section VI, we present experimental results obtained with the proposed algorithm. Finally, in Section VII, we close this paper with final remarks.
II. MATHEMATICAL MODELS
To describe the vehicle motion within the lane, we use a standard single-track vehicle model (see Fig. 1 ). Consider the following differential equations:
where m and J z denote the vehicle mass and yaw inertia, respectively; F y f and F y r are the lateral tire forces at the front and rear axles, respectively; F x f and F x r are the longitudinal tire forces at the front and rear axles, respectively; and v x and v y denote the vehicle's longitudinal and lateral velocity components, respectively. ψ denotes the vehicle direction of travel in a fixed global frame, andψ denotes the vehicle rotation rate around a vertical axis located at the vehicle's center of gravity. l f and l r denote the distances of the front and rear axles, respectively, from the vehicle center of gravity, as shown in Fig. 1 . e y denotes the distance of the vehicle center of gravity from the road centerline. ψ d is the orientation of the road centerline, i.e., the orientation of the tangent to the curve Γ d in the point O in Fig. 1 , and e ψ = ψ − ψ d is the vehicle orientation in the lane. In a real-time application, road curvature c(s), where s denotes distance along the road ahead of the vehicle, might be obtained from a digital map or through a vision system. The sensing technologies in [9] , for example, can be used for this purpose. Further, assumingṡ ≈ v x , the exogenous disturbance signalψ d can then be approximated through the relationψ d = cv x . Hence, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 1: We assume an estimate ofψ d is available over a future finite time horizon.
Forces acting on the vehicle are generated at the contact patch between tire and road. We denote by f x i and f y i the force components acting along the longitudinal and lateral tire axes, which lead to the following longitudinal and lateral force components in the vehicle body frame:
We assume that the vehicle is front wheel driven and calculate the longitudinal force components as
where ρ gives the brake distribution between the front and rear axles imposed by the design of the brake system, and the total longitudinal force f x is considered as an input signal. The lateral tire force components are computed using a simplified version of the magic tire formula [10] , i.e.,
where B i and C i are the stiffness and shape coefficients, respectively, at the two axles; α i are tire slip angles; μ is the friction coefficient; and F z i denotes the normal force. f y0 i is the lateral force in pure cornering conditions. However, simultaneous acceleration and cornering results in a reduced lateral force. This effect is modeled by multiplying f y0 i with ϕ i in (4), [10] . Assuming small angles, the tire slip angles are approximated as
where δ denotes the steering angle at the front wheel and is also considered an input signal. The friction coefficient μ in (4) is considered as an exogenous disturbance signal.
Assumption 2: In this paper, at each time instant, we will assume that an estimate of μ is available, and this is kept constant over a finite time horizon.
In general, friction estimation is however difficult and requires high excitation of the vehicle dynamics. In addition, the most common estimation techniques, based on vehicle dynamics signals, provide estimates of the friction coefficient at the current position but not for the coming road. (See, e.g., [11] and [12] for an overview on friction estimation techniques.)
We write models (1)- (5) in the following compact form:
where
T , and w = [ψ d , μ] are the state, input, and disturbance vectors, respectively.
A. Constraints
Here, we express the requirements that the vehicle stays in the lane while operating in a stable operating region as constraints on the vehicle state, input, and disturbance variables.
Let e y ij , i ∈ {f, r}, j ∈ {l, r}, be the distances of the four vehicle corners from the lane centerline. (e y fr is shown in Fig. 1 .) The requirement that the vehicle stays in the lane is then expressed as follows:
In addition to staying in the lane, we require that the vehicle operates in a region of the state space where the vehicle is easily maneuverable by a normally skilled driver. The requirement that the vehicle operates in stable operating conditions is ensured by limiting the tire slip angles α i as follows:
In this region, the vehicle behavior is predictable by most drivers, and electronic stability control (ESC) systems are inactive.
The driver can influence the vehicle's motion through the input signals δ and f x . The force component f x is limited by the available friction, and the steering wheel angle δ is subject to mechanical constraints imposed by the vehicle design. We will also assume that, for convenience purposes, under normal circumstances, the driver will not impose larger deceleration and steering rate than a max andδ max . We express these limitations as
Rate limitations for the braking force are neglected. Constraints (7)-(9d) can be compactly written as
where 0 is a vector of zeros with appropriate dimension.
III. THREAT ASSESSMENT AS A CONSTRAINT SATISFACTION PROBLEM
Here, we formulate the threat assessment problem as a constraint satisfaction problem (CSP). At each time instant, if the vehicle state does not satisfy the constraints (10), the vehicle's operation can be considered unsafe. The threat assessment problem is therefore formulated as the problem of evaluating whether an admissible sequence of combined steering and braking maneuvers u exists, which can drive the system (6) over a future finite time horizon while satisfying the constraints (10) . Definition 1: The solution of a CSP sol(CSP) is the set of numerical variables Σ for which all constraints C i ∈ C are satisfied, i.e.,
The threat assessment CSP is formulated in discrete time, the continuous-time system (6) is therefore discretized with a sampling time T s to obtain the discrete-time-constrained system, i.e.,
The threat assessment CSP over a one-step horizon can now be stated as
wherex(k) is the vector of state-variable estimates, and e(k) represents the uncertainty associated with the estimates. For each estimate, the uncertainty is considered unknown but bounded, i.e., e(k) ∈ E k , for some bounded set E k . Symbols X k , U k denote the domains associated with the state and input vectors at time step k, respectively. We note that, in the CSP (13) , the disturbance signals w(k), w(k + 1) are not considered as part of the set of numerical variables V. This is a consequence of Assumptions 1 and 2, where estimates of the disturbance signal are assumed available. We remark that if the accuracy of the available sensor setup is poor, it is possible to account for uncertainties by including these signals in V and associated (uncertainty) domains W k , W k+1 in the set of domains D. The N -step threat assessment CSP can be formulated by repetition of (13).
IV. SOLVING CONSTRAINT SATISFACTION PROBLEMS USING INTERVAL TECHNIQUES
Several methods can be used to find the solution Σ to a CSP (see Definition 1). A brief introduction to interval-based consistency techniques is given here, which have been used in the results presented in this paper.
In interval-based consistency techniques, the solution to a CSP, i.e., Σ, is approximated by one or several intervals or boxes [z] i . Solution Σ is obtained by pruning the initial domain of the variables of the CSP and through successive elimination of subboxes, which cannot contain the solution. The consistency techniques most commonly used are known as hull consistency (also called 2B-consistency) and box consistency, or are variations of them [13] . In general, interval techniques are associated with wrapping of generic sets into boxes, decomposition of constraints, and use of interval operations, which leads to overestimation of the solution Σ. This overestimation can be done arbitrarily tight with the cost of increased computational time, as will be described in the following example. In this paper, we utilize interval techniques that provide an outer approximationΣ that is guaranteed to enclose the true solution Σ. The choice of such techniques is described in Section V.
We illustrate the main functionality of the interval techniques through a simple example while, for a rigorous treatment of consistency techniques for CSPs, see [8] and [14] . For the sake of clear and easy presentation, a simplified approach has been adopted in the example.
Example 1: Consider the following nonlinear discrete-time state-space model: 
is defined by (14) .
We start from [x(0)], which in this example is already a box; hence, no wrapping is needed. We utilize a natural in- To improve the accuracy of the solution we split the initial box [x(0)] into four subboxes. We utilize the inclusion function [f d ] again to propagate the two time steps of four subboxes. The obtained results are shown in Fig. 2(b) . We note that, at k = 2, two of the boxes are totally outside the domain D. Consequently, they can be excluded from the solution setΣ (for all k), and higher accuracy of the solution set can be obtained.
)] two time steps and obtain interval approximations of {x(1), x(2) ∈ D|x(k
The process of splitting and propagating boxes can be continued until the desired accuracy has been reached, the solution is empty, or the computational time is out. In Fig. 2(c) , the result after four divisions of the boxes is shown. Clearly, the solutions in Fig. 2(c) are smaller and more accurate than the solutions in Fig. 2(a) .
V. INTERVAL-BASED THREAT ASSESSMENT ALGORITHM
In Section III, we formulated the threat assessment problem as a CSP, and in Section IV, we showed how such problems can be solved with interval techniques. Here, we formulate the threat assessment algorithm that is to be repeatedly solved in an automotive safety system.
Denote by W k = [w k , w k+1 , . . . , w k+N −1 ] a sequence of disturbance samples over the horizon [k, k + N − 1]. We formulate an N -step threat assessment CSP and enforce the constraints (10) to hold for each time step over a finite time horizon of N steps as follows:
A threat assessment algorithm that sets a safety flag in case that the threat assessment CSP (15) has an empty solution, hereby referred to as Algorithm 1, has been implemented. In Algorithm 1, an interval-based branch-and-prune algorithm is used to find the solutionΣ = sol(CSP T A ) of the threat assessment CSP (15) . As noted in Section IV, the solution Σ obtained with the interval solver is an outer approximation that encloses the true solution Σ, i.e., Σ ⊆Σ. Consequently, Σ = ∅ =⇒ Σ = ∅; hence, based on the model (12), a violation of the constraints (10) can be guaranteed within the horizon of N -steps ifΣ is empty. In such case, a flag notSaf e is set, activating an autonomous intervention or warning. Waiting untilΣ = ∅ reduces the risk of activating autonomous interventions in situations where the driver is not in need of assistance. However, if the difference between the setsΣ and Σ is large, the autonomous intervention might be delayed, which limits the effect of the intervention.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
To validate the proposed threat assessment approach, experimental testing has been conducted at a test track located approximately 100 km outside Göteborg, Sweden. The test track is about 5 km long and is shown in Fig. 3 . Measurements of the state variables and disturbances were collected using a differential Global Positioning System unit, which is a built-in high-precision inertial measurement unit along with a digital TABLE I  VEHICLE MODEL PARAMETERS   TABLE II  DESIGN PARAMETERS map. The test vehicle was driven several laps by a professional driver, which adopted both a normal and rougher driving style. In the normal driving case, the driver was asked to keep the posted speed limits, whereas in the rougher driving case, the driver was driving as fast as possible. During driving, the proposed threat assessment was inactive, and the collected data have instead been postprocessed through Algorithm 1 using a laptop PC. This enables the possibility to evaluate the performance of the threat assessment approach without influencing the vehicle motion and driver behavior through safety interventions. For postprocessing with Algorithm 1, no upper bound on the computational time was set.
The parameter values used are provided in Tables I and II.  The parameters in Table I are vehicle specific, whereas the parameters in Table II are design parameters. The desired behavior of a safety system is subjective, and similar with, e.g., stability control systems, drivers have different preferences on activation timing and control authority. Large values of the bounds in Table II delay interventions and can jeopardize safety, whereas small values will lead to a system that intervenes often and might be perceived as intrusive. For a commercial application, it is possible to give drivers possibility to choose from a set of parameter configurations to accommodate the needs and preferences of different drivers. In this paper, the performance of the threat assessment algorithm has been tuned and evaluated based on its ability to predict constraint violations that actually occur, and avoiding false constraint violation predictions, rather than relying on preferences of specific drivers. Bound e y max has been set by the road width, and the rest of the design parameters in Table II have been tuned by balancing between maintaining a capability to detect threats while avoiding interventions when no constraint violation is imminent.
Uncertainties in the state estimates have been accounted for by setting (16) wherex i (k) denotes the ith component of the measured state vectorx(k). We remark that, potentially, the performance of the proposed threat assessment method could be further improved by utilizing knowledge about the measurement accuracy of the sensors used to acquire the state estimates.
The performance of the proposed algorithm, where combined steering and braking maneuvers of the driver are considered, is compared with a previously published algorithm where only steering is considered. We will refer to this alternative algorithm as Algorithm 2. In Algorithm 2, the vehicle model is linear, and the threat assessment problem is then easier to solve. Details about the alternative algorithm are provided in [15] . The proposed threat assessment algorithm, i.e., Algorithm 1, proved capable of predicting violation of the constraints (10) within the prediction horizon without issuing any false detections in the considered data set.
Next, we show results obtained in the situations shown in Fig. 3 , where the following notation is used. a i denotes a time instant where the Algorithm 1 returns notSaf e = 1, i.e., when the solution setΣ is empty. In Fig. 3 , the vehicle positions at times a i are marked out with a darker color vehicle. b i = a i − 100 ms and corresponding positions are marked with the symbol • in Fig. 3 . These positions have been indicated for analysis purposes. c i are time instances where the alternative (steering only) threat assessment algorithm, i.e., Algorithm 2, predicts a constraint violation, and the corresponding positions are marked with the brighter color vehicle in Fig. 3 . Finally, d i denotes a time instance where a violation of the constraints (10) occurs, and corresponding positions are marked with the symbol .
Consider the time instances d 1 , d 2 , and d 3 . At times d 1 and d 2 , the vehicle is traveling at a speed of approximately 90 km/h, and at d 3 , the speed is approximately 110 km/h. We note that, at these time instances, the vehicle violates the position constraints (7) by crossing the lane marking at the inner side of the curves. In Fig. 3 , the positions at the time instances c 1 , c 2 , and c 3 indicate that Algorithm 2 predicts these situations somewhat early. At times c 1 , c 2 , and c 3 , it is, according to Algorithm 2, no longer possible to avoid a constraint violation by the adopted steering-only approach. Figs. 4-6 show the solution setsΣ obtained by Algorithm 1 at times b 1 , b 2 , and b 3 , respectively. At these time instances, the solution setsΣ are not empty, which indicates that, potentially, there exists some combined braking and steering action that can keep the vehicle within the lane from these positions. Nevertheless, Figs. 4-6 show that the driver chooses to maintain the high velocity and steering angle in these situations. Potentially, the driver was willing to risk slightly crossing the lane markings to be able to maintain a high speed throughout the curve while keeping away from the outer lane border. Consequently, at times a 1 , a 2 , and a 3 , the solution setsΣ are empty; hence, at these points, according to the assumed model and control limitations, the constraint violation has become unavoidable. At these time instances, it took the algorithm 690, 300, and < 1 ms, respectively, to conclude thatΣ is empty.
If the available actuators can overcome the assumed control limitations of the driver, an assisting intervention might be issued in such situations to avoid the imminent constraint violation. In Fig. 3 , we note that an intervention based on Algorithm 2 would come early and, hence, increase the possibility of avoiding the constraint violation, as compared with Algorithm 1, which, as noted in Fig. 3 , detects the constraint violation late. In general, however, curve cutting is often actively chosen by the driver and, thus, becomes unavoidable very late. In such situations, the driver might thus perceive an early intervention as intrusive. (8); hence, the constraint violation predicted by Algorithm 1 can be considered correct.
The experimental vehicle was equipped with an ESC system, which, in this situation, was activated. The stability control system can apply braking to individual wheels and is thus not restricted by the assumed control limitations of the driver. By braking individual wheels, additional yaw moment is generated by the stability system, forcing the vehicle back in to the stable operating region. Keeping the vehicle in the lane is however not an objective of the electronic stability system. Instead, the driver needs to steer the vehicle correctly to stay in the lane. In this case, although the vehicle is forced back in to the stable operating region, the stabilizing intervention combined with the driver's steering action does not keep the vehicle in the lane. At time a 5 , Algorithm 1 recognizes that, although the vehicle is operating within the stable operating region, due to the position and motion of the vehicle, a violation of the constraints (7) is unavoidable. This took 28 ms. At time d 5 ∈ [a 5 , a 5 + NT s ], the vehicle's front left corner indeed crosses the outer lane marking violating the constraints (7), as predicted by Algorithm 1. In this situation, both the violations of the stability constraints at time d 4 and the position constraints at time d 5 , seems to be related to the excessive speed adopted when the vehicle approached the curve (see Fig. 8 ). In this case, a braking safety intervention issued based on either Algorithm 1 at the time instant a 4 or by Algorithm 2 at the time instant c 4 might have reduced the speed enough to avoid the constraint violations.
Finally, we highlight that, in the considered data set, no false constraint violations where indicated by Algorithm 1, whereas Algorithm 2, in some cases, predicted constraint violations that the driver managed to avoid by reducing speed, As an example, consider the point corresponding to the time instant b 6 , shown in Fig. 3 . In this point, the solution set obtained in Algorithm 2 is empty. However, since no subsequent constraint violation occurs, this can be considered a false threat detection. The solution set obtained with Algorithm 1 is on the other hand nonempty and is shown in Fig. 9 . We note that the solution set obtained with Algorithm 1 encloses the actual trajectory traversed by the vehicle and that no intervention is needed in this scenario.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
A model-based threat assessment method, which accounts for combined braking and steering maneuvers in assessing the risk of unintended roadway departures, has been presented and evaluated using experimental data. Compared with previously published approaches, which account for steering only, the present method reduces the risk of false threat detection while maintaining the ability to predict constraint violations. The preliminary results presented in this paper have motivated further investigation of the algorithm's ability to predict constraint violations and the frequency of false threat detections.
